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NOTE
LETTING THE FOX GUARD THE HENHOUSE: WHY
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S RULING IN POSITIVE
SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS SACRIFICES PROCEDURAL
FAIRNESS FOR SPEED AND CONVENIENCE
Linden Fry+
The appeal of resolving disagreements through arbitration is an age-old
concept with roots that can be traced from the Greek myth "The Judgment of
Paris."'  Arbitration is a concept so intuitive that children on a playground,
without knowledge of Greek mythology, use it every day as a quick and easy
method to resolve disputes. The children with a dispute agree to bring their
2dispute to another neutral child. This resolves the issue without black eyes,
torn shirts, or a trip to the principal's office, and the parties go their ways with
a resolution.3
Unfortunately, playground arbitration, like the arbitration in "The Judgment
of Paris" and most other forms of arbitration, is susceptible to a fatal flaw:
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1. LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2:1, at 2-1 (3d ed.
2008). Greek mythology tells a story of arbitration gone wrong in "The Judgment of Paris." See
id. In the tale, Zeus appointed Paris, because of his reputation for impartiality, to arbitrate a
dispute between the goddesses Hera, Athene, and Aphrodite over which one was the fairest and
thus deserving of the golden apple. Greek Myths, The Judgment of Paris, http://www.living
myths.comlgreek.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) [hereinafter The Judgment of Paris].
2. See generally EDMONSON, supra note 1, § 2:1, at 2-1 (noting that "[t]he concept of
arbitration is not novel"; it is a method long used to resolve disputes that is more efficient and
constructive than traditional adversarial approaches).
3. Arbitration, both in the schoolyard and in business, has three essential attributes. First,
the decision to arbitrate is consensual, with all parties agreeing to it. GARY BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994). Second, "non-
governmental decision-makers" resolve the dispute. Id. Finally, absent flaws in the process, it
produces a "definitive and binding award" that is capable of being enforced by a court. Id.
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what happens when the neutral arbitrator selected is not really neutral?4 To
this day, the issue as to when courts should vacate arbitration because of the
appearance of bias on the part of the arbitrator remains nested at the forefront
of arbitration.5 As evidence of this, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, in Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New
Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software I1), reversed a panel decision and
concluded that an arbitrator's undisclosed connection to one of the parties did
not constitute grounds for vacation of the arbitrator's decision under the
Federal Arbitration Act.6 In the short time since Positive Software II was
decided, several lower federal courts have relied on the opinion in deciding
cases requiring the interpretation of "evident partiality."
7
However, the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Positive Software H does little to
clarify the confusion over how the "evident partiality" standard should be
interpreted and applied by federal courts when considering whether to vacate
an arbitration decision. More importantly, the decision misinterprets Supreme
Court precedent on the issue and sets an unduly high standard for determining
when arbitration awards should be overturned because of an arbitrator's failure
to disclose possible sources of bias.8 As a result, parties selecting arbitrators
will be stripped of the mechanism for obtaining meaningful appellate review of
arbitration awards in circumstances of alleged arbitrator "evident partiality."
Federal courts need to ensure that the process of federally endorsed
arbitration is free from bias, corruption, and the appearance of impropriety.
9
4. For example, the story of "The Judgment of Paris" resulted in the Trojan War. The
Judgment of Paris, supra note 1. Unfortunately, while Paris was making his decision, Aphrodite
offered him the love of the world's most beautiful woman. Id. When Paris then rendered his
judgment in favor of Aphrodite, he was granted the love of Helen, the most beautiful woman in
the world. Id. The problem was, Helen was already married-to a powerful Trojan man. Id.
5. See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp. 2d 733, 785-88 (S.D.
Tex. 2008) (addressing the allegation that an arbitrator failed to disclose that he had served as
counsel against one of the parties in a previous litigation); Amicorp Inc. v. Gene. Steel Domestic
Sales, LLC, Civil No. 07-cv-01 105-LTB-BNB, 2007 WL 2890089, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 27,
2007) (debating the appropriate legal standard when a party challenges an arbitration award
because of bias or the appearance of bias); Toroyan v. Barrett, 495 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351-52
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing when a relationship between an arbitrator and a party reaches a level
where an arbitration award should be overturned because it creates an impression of possible
bias).
6. Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software I1),
476 F.3d 278, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2007) (en bane).
7. See, e.g., Halliburton Energy Servs., 533 F. Supp. 2d at 786; Amicorp Inc., 2007 WL
2890089, at *3; Toroyan, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 351 n.4.
8. See infra Part I.B. for a discussion of Supreme Court precedent on partiality in
arbitration.
9. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS
USERS 109 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001) ("Arbitral integrity and
fairmindedness are critical to the working of the process and to parties' perceptions of
arbitration."); see also Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration Law, in ARBITRATION
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 15 (2006) ("[I]mpartial arbitrators are essential to
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Without this guarantee, meeting the other goals of the arbitration process,
namely efficiency, cost effectiveness, and finality, become irrelevant.' 0 To
accomplish this task, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
(FAA), which empowered courts to vacate otherwise binding arbitration
awards when the arbitrator was corrupt or showed "evident partiality."I The
passage of this Act marked the beginning of a "national policy favoring
arbitration." 12 Willingness by federal courts to interpret and properly apply
this power is essential to the continued impartiality and success of the
arbitration process.13
Many commentators and jurists consider the FAA to be one of the first
modem arbitration statutes because it provides for a judicial role that
permanently validates arbitration agreements and creates very limited grounds
the integrity of the arbitration process . . . . [A]rbitration ...has a foundational need for an
impartial decision maker.").
10. See Brunet, supra note 9 (noting that while it is essential to have arbitrators who are
experts in the field, having experts cannot be a substitute for having neutral and impartial
arbitrators).
11. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)H2) (2000).
12. See Terry L. Trantina, An Attorney's Guide to Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR), in
ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES 29, 185-86 (PLI Corp. Law
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1102, 1999) (commenting that "decision making by
independent neutrals is central to the arbitration process" and the "basic tenet of procedural
fairness assumes [great] significance").
13. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). In enacting the statute, "Congress
overruled [many] years of judicial hostility toward arbitration." Elizabeth A. Murphy, Note,
Standards of Arbitrator Impartiality: How Impartial Must They Be?, 1996 J. DISp. RESOL. 463,
466. Congressman Mills described the law as providing "that where there are commercial
contracts and there is disagreement under the contract, the court can [en]force an arbitration
agreement in the same way as other portions of the contract." 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924)
(statement of Cong. Mills). Over time, state law has also begun formally to recognize and
regulate arbitration as well. See Murphy, supra, at 467. Since 1955, when the Uniform
Arbitration Act was created, it has been adopted by thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia, and fourteen states have enacted substantially similar provisions. Id Therefore, in
most federal and state courts today, "agreements to arbitrate ... are valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable." Id
In the words of Congressman Graham, the FAA was designed to give arbitral parties the
ability to bring arbitration decisions "before the court in order to give enforcement to that which
they have already agreed to." 65 CONG. REC. 1,931 (1924) (statement of Cong. Graham). Before
the law's enactment in 1925, courts were distrustful of arbitration awards and would routinely
intervene and overturn an arbitrator's decision. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 77 (2d ed. 2007). This approach by the courts hindered the
effectiveness of arbitration as an alternative to judicial resolution of disputes. Id. "Congress
decided to set a policy in this field and promulgated the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-14, in 1925, to delineate the thorny relationship between the role of private arbitration and
the federal courts." Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive
Software 1), 436 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2006), rev'd en bane, Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v.
New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software I1), 476 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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for vacating arbitration awards.1 4  Generally, the FAA authorizes courts to
refuse enforcement of arbitration awards because of certain procedural flaws,
15
creating a strong presumption that once an arbitration award is rendered, it is
legally enforceable.'
6
In Part I, this Note will discuss § 10 of the FAA, specifically focusing on its
standards for determining when federal courts will vacate arbitration awards.
Part I will then focus on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA's
"evident partiality" language in Commonwealth Coatings and examine how
lower courts have construed the decision. Part II of this Note will review the
recent decision in Positive Software II. Finally, Part III will analyze Positive
Software II and conclude with a discussion of why the decision runs counter to
the FAA, the Supreme Court's interpretation of "evident partiality," and the
best interests of the arbitral system.
I. EVIDENT PARTIALITY
Any discussion of "evident partiality" should begin with an analysis of the
FAA, the statute that created the phrase. At its root, the Fifth Circuit's en banc
decision in Positive Software II is the most recent significant attempt by a
circuit court to decide what standard should be used to determine when an
arbitrator's decision will be overturned because of "evident partiality."']7 Thus,
to trace the real meaning of the term, this Note will begin with the term's
genesis, the FAA.
A. The Official Beginning: The FAA
The FAA established a governmental policy favoring arbitration. 
8
Arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution because it is a quick,
efficient, expertly reasoned conflict resolution process that generally is free
14. CARBONNEAU, supra note 13, at 78 (noting that the statute also gives the arbitration
process "the systemic autonomy it needs to function effectively as a remedial process"); see also
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 15 (1992) ("The key characteristic
distinguishing nonmodem from modem [arbitration statutes] is that the latter make simple
executory agreements to arbitrate disputes ... [which are] irrevocable and fully enforceable and
the former do not.").
15. CARBONNEAU, supra note 13, at 124 ("The basis for denying legal effect to an [arbitral]
award is quite limited. In the main, only significant procedural deficiencies in the arbitral process
can thwart the enforcement of an award.").
16. Id. at 124-25 ("The limited number of grounds [for vacatur] and their restrictive scope
reflect the FAA's liberal disposition toward arbitration .... A nearly irrebuttable presumption
exists in the federal case law that arbitral awards, once rendered, are legally enforceable.").
17. See Positive Software 11, 476 F.3d at 282-83 (surveying decisions from numerous
circuits across the country).
18. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10 ("in enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared
a national policy favoring arbitration .... ").
[Vol. 58:599
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from judicial interference. 19 For these reasons, the FAA provides little solace
to those wishing to modify or overturn an arbitration award.20 Even those
parties who are permitted to seek vacatur of their awards are prohibited from
rearguing their claims.2 1  Parties are thus restricted to arguing that the
procedure, rather than the ultimate decision, was flawed.22
The FAA does not directly govern an arbitrator's conduct.23 However, in
order to keep the arbitration process free from partiality or corruption, the
drafters of the FAA added subsection 2 to § 10(a). It provides that the losing
party may protest an arbitration award "[w]here there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.",
25
19. See EDMONSON, supra note 1, § 1:5, at 1-13 ("[Mlany [disputes] can be resolved, to the
advantage of everyone, quickly and in a less costly fashion, by resorting to arbitration rather than
by using the traditional adversarial method of dispute resolution."); see also Brunet, supra note 9,
at 3 (determining that arbitration rests on the "firm bedrock of... efficiency .... party autonomy,
privatization, arbitrator expertise, neutrality, and finality").
20. See Fine v. Bear, Steams & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the
courts' "power to vacate an arbitration award must be extremely limited because an overly
expansive judicial review of arbitration awards would undermine the litigation efficiencies which
arbitration seeks to achieve"); see, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640,
643 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The Federal Arbitration Act ('FAA') expresses a presumption that
arbitration awards will be confirmed."); see also Nat'l Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Princess Mgmt. Co.,
597 F.2d 819, 825 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Arbitration cannot achieve the savings in time and money for
which it is justly renowned if it becomes merely the first step in lengthy litigation.").
21. Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting a previous holding "that parties are not entitled to reargue their claims in a proceeding to
vacate an arbitral award ... litigation like this defeats the goal of arbitration to provide a quick
and cheap decision" (citing Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir. 1994))).
22. See id. The standard of review given to the courts is "one of the narrowest standards of
judicial review in all of American jurisprudence." Lattimer-Stevens Co. v. United Steelworkers,
913 F.2d 1166, 1169 (6th Cir. 1990). The "narrow" review available to the courts is enumerated
in § 10 and § 11 of the FAA. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2000). Section I1 allows a judge only to
"modify and correct" an award. Id. § 11.
23. See Lee Korland, Comment, What an Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose:
Proposing a New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 815, 821 (2003) ("Any requirement that an arbitrator disclose potentially disqualifying
conflicts of interest or conduct an investigation to uncover such conflicts stems from case law and
suggested guidelines by organizations within the field of arbitration.").
24. See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 13, at 124-27 (noting that the purpose of FAA
subsection 10(a)(2) is to give courts limited supervisory authority).
25. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). Section 10(a) also allows vacatur for the following other reasons:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
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Because of the importance in keeping the arbitration process free from fraud
or corruption, and the limited ability of losing parties to challenge arbitration
awards on other grounds, many courts have carefully reviewed the "evident
26partiality" language of § 10(a)(2). The interpretation of "evident partiality"
in § 10(a)(2) has a significant effect on the ability of parties to challenge an
arbitration; if interpreted to require only the appearance of bias, § 10(a)(2)
becomes the only way to have an arbitration award vacated without a showing
of actual, prejudicial wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrator.
27
Proving actual misconduct or bias on the part of an arbitrator can be a
difficult proposition because the arbitration process tends to be private in
28nature and often is not well documented. The product of arbitration under
the FAA is not usually a "discursive opinion"; rather, it is typically "a one-
page award that merely denotes the final result of a dispute without
,,29explanation. Without a detailed record of the proceedings or the rationale
behind an arbitrator's decision, proving wrongful acts by the arbitrator can be
nearly impossible.30
B. The Supreme Court's Only Bite at the Apple: Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., the Supreme
Court interpreted the term "evident partiality" and ruled that, absent any sign
of actual bias or corruption on the part of the arbitrator, an arbitrator's
undisclosed financial relationship with an attorney for one of the parties
provided a basis to vacate the arbitrator's decision.31 In ruling on the matter,
the Court rendered its only interpretation of § 1 0(a)(2) of the FAA.
32
Id. § 10(a)(1), (3), (4).
26. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d
278, 280-83 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (discussing how the court should interpret the "evident
partiality" standard of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) and citing how many other courts have addressed the
same problem).
27. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
28. See Brunet, supra note 9, at 9 ("Typically, arbitration in the United States ends silently
with a cryptic written award that does not contain a discursive opinion."); see also Consol. Coal
Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers, 48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995) (proving actual bias in
an arbitration decision is an almost insurmountable task).
29. See Brunet, supra note 9, at 9.
30. See id. (stating that the "secrecy" of the process is desired by many who use it).
31. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146-47 (1968).
32. See Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. 84-2646-CIV, 1986 WL 20915, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 17, 1986) (noting that "the unquestioned starting point" when addressing "evident
partiality" is Commonwealth Coatings); see also Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the "leading case on evident partiality is
Commonwealth Coatings"). Foreshadowing that holding, Justice Black stated that the question to
be resolved was "whether elementary requirements of impartiality taken for granted in every
judicial proceeding are suspended when the parties agree to resolve a dispute through federal
arbitration." Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 145.
[Vol. 58:599
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The case arose after a disputed arbitration between the parties. 33 After a
panel of three arbitrators rendered its decision, the neutral arbitrator, who also
worked as an engineering consultant, was found to have conducted business
with one of the parties "from time to time at irregular intervals." 34 The Court
noted that, although the total business transacted between the arbitrator and the
party equaled approximately $12,000, the relationship "was in a sense
sporadic," occurred over the course of a few years, and "there had been no
dealings between [the arbitrator and the party] for about a year immediately
preceding the arbitration. 35
Even taking into account the somewhat "sporadic" nature of the relationship
between the party and the arbitrator, six Justices concluded that the arbitrator's
failure to disclose the relationship before the commencement of the arbitration
36constituted "evident partiality," and vacated the decision. The majority
holding was reached by combining two opinions: Justice Black's opinion and
Justice White's concurrence.
37
1. Justice Black's Opinion
Justice Black reasoned that under the circumstances, where there was no
allegation of actual fraud or bias, but merely a periodic relationship between
one of the parties and the arbitrator, vacatur was still appropriate.38 According
to Justice Black, Congress intended the "evident partiality" clause of § I 0(a)(2).... 39
to ensure a fair and impartial arbitral process. Thus, the undisclosed
33. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146. Before the disagreement, both parties had
contracted to settle all disputes through binding arbitration when they signed a painting contract.
Id. After the parties encountered a dispute over monies due, they entered into arbitration, as
dictated by the contract. Id. Under the terms of the arbitral contract, the "petitioner appointed
one arbitrator, the [respondent] appointed a second, and these two [arbitrators] together selected
the third arbitrator." Id. The third arbitrator was a "supposedly neutral" party. Id
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally id at 145. Justice Black stated that the question to be resolved was
"whether elementary requirements of impartiality taken for granted in every judicial proceeding
are suspended when the parties agree to resolve a dispute through federal arbitration." Id.
37. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 644 n.5 (6th Cir. 2005)
(noting that Justice Marshall joined in Justice White's concurrence).
Because this combination of votes resulted in a debate on whether the Commonwealth
Coatings decision was a majority or a plurality opinion, this Note will refer to the opinions as
"Justice Black's opinion" and "Justice White's concurrence" or "Justice White's opinion."
38. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147-48 (stating that the "undisclosed business
relationship" at issue was a "manifest violation of the strict morality and fairness Congress would
have expected on the part of the arbitrator and the other party in [the] case").
39. Id. at 147 (concluding that "Congress [intended] to provide not merely for any
arbitration but for an impartial one").
2009]
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relationship fell below the ethical standards Congress intended when it enacted
the FAA.
The Court reached this conclusion by reasoning that Congress expects
arbitrators to perform their functions with "strict morality and fairness.
41
Justice Black reasoned that Congress intended the duty of an arbitrator to be
similar, though not identical, to that of a judge or a jury.42 An arbitrator's
failure to disclose "financial relations" that previously existed between the
arbitrator and one of the parties violated this "strict morality and fairness"
standard, regardless of whether the arbitrator's decision was demonstrated to
be actually biased.4 3
The opinion suggested that the standard for arbitrators should be higher than
that for judges or jurors because there are fewer oversight mechanisms in place
for arbitrators than for judges.44 Justice Black reasoned that judges maintain
proper decorum partly because of the possibility of an appeal and the potential
for reversal of their decisions, whereas arbitrators do not have to be concerned
45with similar oversight. Because the threat of appeal and reversal as an
impetus to prevent judicial bias is not present in arbitral decisions, Justice
40. See id. at 147-48. Justice Black's opinion makes a clear distinction between actual
evidence of an arbitrator's bias or fraud and the appearance of an arbitrator's bias or fraud. Id.
Justice Black concluded that actual bias should not be a prerequisite to finding that an arbitrator
violated Congress's intended guidelines. Id.
41. Id. at 148.
42. Id. Justice Black's opinion relied on the standards set forth in Tumey v. Ohio, which
analyzed the circumstances in which a judgment should be overturned due to an undisclosed
financial connection of a judge to a case. Id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). The
Court in Tumey found that it "deprives a defendant.., of due process of law, to subject his liberty
or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927). The Tumey Court held that "it is very clear [in English common law] that the
slightest pecuniary interest of any officer, judicial or quasi-judicial, in the resolving of the subject
matter which he was to decide, rendered the decision voidable." Id at 524. Justice Black's
opinion in Commonwealth Coatings added that although the undisclosed possible bias may be
slight, the size of the connection is irrelevant to the question of "evident partiality."
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148. As Justice Black's opinion states: "[s]ince in the case
of courts[,] [impartiality] is a constitutional principle, we can see no basis for refusing to find the
same concept in the broad statutory language that governs arbitration proceedings and provides
that an award can be set aside on the basis of 'evident partiality."' Id
43. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148.
44. Id. at 149.
45. Id. (stating that the courts should "be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality
of arbitrators than judges"). This heightened standard should apply because "the former have
completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review."
Id.; see also Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 379, 425-26 (1995) (postulating that because of the constant threat of reversal by a higher
court "judges are less likely to follow their predilections or to exercise favoritism").
[Vol. 58:599
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Black concluded that higher standards of conduct be enforced directly on
arbitrators.46
Justice Black's opinion in Commonwealth Coatings adopted a simple rule:
"dealings that might create an impression of possible bias" on the part of an
arbitrator, regardless of actual bias in the decision, is enough to allow for
vacatur of an arbitral award.47 As a result, arbitrators will be held to similar
standards as those applied to Article III judges.48 This standard, as laid out by
Justice Black, is commonly referred to as the "appearance of bias standard. ' '49
2. Justice White's Concurrence: "Glad to Join My Brother Black"
Proper analysis of Commonwealth Coatings is difficult because lower courts
disagree on exactly what treatment to give Justice Black's opinion.50 Because
two of the six Justices who comprised the majority only concurred with Justice
Black, 51 many courts have interpreted Commonwealth Coatings as generating
52no majority decision; rather, they assert that it is a plurality decision. As a
46. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149. Justice Black's opinion also considered the
Rules of Ethics of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), which governs disclosure of
possible bias by one of its sanctioned arbitrators. Id. (citing § 18 of the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association). One canon of the AAA code, which is similar to that of the bias rules in
the 33d Canon of Judicial Ethics, requests that arbitrators "disclose any circumstances likely to
create a presumption of bias." Id. at 149-50. Justice Black combined the arbitration rule with
Congress's requirement that the proceedings be free from "evident partiality," to conclude that
arbitrators have a duty to disclose all sources that "might create an impression of possible bias."
Id.
47. Id at 150 (stating that "[t]his rule of arbitration and this canon of judicial ethics rest on
the premise that any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be
unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias").
48. See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d
132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Justice Black imported this rigorous [appearance of bias] standard from
those safeguarding the impartiality of Article III judges."). Justice Black "[could not] believe that
it was the purpose of Congress to authorize litigants to submit their cases and controversies to
arbitration boards that might reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and favorable to
another." Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.
49. See Amicorp Inc. v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, Civil No. 07-cv-01 105-LTB-
BNB, 2007 WL 2890089, at *3 (D. Colo., Sept. 27, 2007) ("The standard articulated in Justice
Black's opinion is often referred to as the 'appearance of bias standard .... '); see also Tamari v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1198 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Commonwealth Coatings held
that § 10(b) implicitly allowed the setting aside of arbitration awards ... even if actual bias or
corruption is not found .... ").
50. See Positive Software Solutions Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software
11), 476 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that courts and scholars have found that
the rule of law stemming from Commonwealth Coatings is "not pellucid"); see also Amicorp Inc.,
2007 WL 2890089, at *3 (pointing out that "circuits differ on their interpretation of the
[Commonwealth Coatings] holding").
51. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (beginning Justice White's concurrence,
which was joined by Justice Marshall).
52. Positive Software II, 476 F.3d at 281. A plurality decision can be defined as one where
"the opinion announced [by the Court] has not been acceptable to a majority of the justices sitting
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result, many courts have declined to follow Justice Black's opinion by
distinguishing it on the grounds that it does not speak for the majority of the
Court; instead, they follow Justice White's concurrence. 53  However, these
courts minimize the significance of the first sentence in Justice White's
concurrence, where he stated that he was "glad to join [his] Brother Black's
opinion.
In his concurrence, Justice White argued that conduct by arbitrators should
not be held to the same standard that is applied to Article III judges.55 This is
because arbitrators, unlike judges, often are members of the same business
community as the parties to the arbitration. 56 The concurring opinion states
that there is "no reason automatically to disqualify the best informed and most
capable potential arbitrators" as a result of their activities and relationships in
the industry.
57
Under the statute governing the recusal of Article III judges, a judge must
recuse him or herself in "any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. ' '58  Thus, if an Article III judge rather than an
arbitrator was slated to hear the initial dispute in Commonwealth Coatings, the
judge would have been forced to withdraw because of his past financial
relationship with one of the parties. 59 Moreover, the parties would have been
in a case, but where a judgment disposing of the case can be supported by combining two or more
separate opinions." John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions
in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 59.
53. See, e.g., Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 137.
54. See, e.g., Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691,
697 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J.,
concurring)).
55. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id. Among other comments, Justice White clearly stated that he did not believe
arbitrators should be held to the same "standards of judicial decorum [as] Article III judges, or
indeed of any judges." Id. He did, however, specifically note:
This does not mean the judiciary must overlook outright chicanery in giving effect to
their awards; that would be an abdication of our responsibility. But it does mean that
arbitrators are not automatically disqualified by a business relationship with the parties
before them if both the parties are informed of the relationship in advance ....
Id.
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000) (dictating that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned"). Note that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) mirrors almost identically Canon 3,
section E of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), with MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2 (stating that "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself
in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (requiring a judge to "disqualify himself [if]: ... [h]e knows that
he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding").
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unable to waive the judge's possible conflict irrespective of whether they were
put on proper notice of the past financial relationship.
60
Justice White advocates that arbitrators should be treated differently than
judges and not be "automatically disqualified by a business relationship" with
one or more of the parties to the litigation.6 1 In his view, "if both parties are
informed of the relationship in advance," and still consent to the arbitrator,
they should be allowed to continue. 62  In this way, the parties are not
foreclosed from having the highest quality arbitrators hear their disputes.
63
The remainder of Justice White's concurring opinion appears to completely
support Justice Black's opinion.64  Specifically, Justice White agreed with
Justice Black in overturning the decision of the arbitrator, even though there
was no finding or indication of impartiality or bias.65 Oddly, however, the
concurring opinion only provided a standard for overturning arbitration
decisions involving actual bias.66 It concluded with the mandate that "where
the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm . . . that fact must be
,,67disclosed.' Thus, with respect to whether arbitrators should be held to the
same standard as federal judges, Justice White did not adopt the same standard65
proposed by Justice Black. However, a clear majority of the Court agreed
that arbitrators must "disclose any circumstances likely to create a presumption
of bias."
69
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).
61. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that Justice White's
concurrence was not intended to differ from Justice Black's opinion, but merely to add
"additional remarks"). Justice White went on to discuss the importance of arbitrators disclosing
possible conflicts, specifically stating that it is far more beneficial to state possible relationships at
the beginning of arbitration proceedings and leave it to the parties to choose whether to accept or
protest the arbitrator before a decision has been issued, rather than challenge possible bias after a
decision has been issued. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring). He
suggested that disclosure beforehand would minimize challenges based on an arbitrator's possibly
conflicting relations. Id. ("It is far better for a relationship to be disclosed at the outset ... than to
have the relationship come to light after the arbitration, when a suspicious or disgruntled party
can seize on it .... ).
65. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151-52. Justice White inserted a footnote
specifically acknowledging that the lower court found the arbitrator's action to be "entirely fair
and impartial." Id. at 151 n.*.
66. Amicorp Inc. v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, Civil No. 07-cv-01 105-LTB-BNB,
2007 WL 2890089, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2007) ("The standard articulated in Justice Black's
opinion is often referred to as the broader 'appearance of bias standard,' and the stricter or
narrower standard in Justice White's concurrence is referred to as the 'actual bias standard."').
67. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 151-52 (White, J., concurring).
68. See supra note 66.
69. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149 (plurality opinion).
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C. As Simple as Black Versus White? Life After Commonwealth Coatings
The Supreme Court has never clarified its decision in Commonwealth
Coatings; however, many lower federal courts have tried.7v  Unfortunately,
these attempts have failed to provide clarity on whether Justice Black's opinion
should be given majority status.7' Specifically, it is unclear how much "actual
bias," as opposed to "the appearance of bias," will be repuired before a court
will conclude that an arbitration award should be vacated.
1. The White Team: Using Marks v. United States to Reject Justice Black's
"Appearance of Bias - Language
The majority of circuits have chosen to inore the "appearance of bias"
standard set forth in Justice Black's opinion. These courts have stated that
the vacatur of an arbitrator's decision under FAA § 10(b) is only appropriate
when there is proof of "actual bias" on the part of the arbitrator, because
Justice Black's opinion should be read as dicta and the weight of the Court's
opinion should be given to Justice White's concurrence.
75
The courts' decisions to give legal authority to Justice White's concurrence
rather than Justice Black's opinion can be explained by the "Marks rule."
7 6
Marks v. United States holds that when the Court delivers a plurality opinion,
70. See generally Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
(Positive Software If), 476 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing the lower courts
that have rendered their own interpretation of Commonwealth Coatings).
71. ldat282-83.
72. See Amicorp Inc. v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, Civil No. 07-cv-01 105-LTB-
BNB, 2007 WL 2890089, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2007) (describing that "[b]ecause the ruling
was a 'plurality-plus' decision, the circuits differ on their interpretation of the holding"); see also
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that lower courts
are provided "little guidance because of the inability of a majority of Justices [in Commonwealth
Coatings] to agree on anything but the result").
73. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting the "appearance of bias" standard espoused in Justice Black's opinion in
Commonwealth Coatings and noting that "a majority of the Court did not endorse the 'appearance
of bias' standard set forth in the plurality opinion"); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc.,
173 F.3d 493, 499 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that "mere nondisclosure does not in itself justify
vacatur"); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d
79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (reading "Section 10(b) [of the FAA] as requiring a showing of
something more than the mere 'appearance of bias' to vacate an arbitration award); Ormsbee Dev.
Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is only clear evidence of impropriety
which justifies the denial of summary confirmation of an arbitration award.").
74. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co., 173 F.3d at 499-500 (stating that a plaintiff must establish that
the arbitrator was impartial and that a failure to disclose is insufficient for vacatur).
75. See, e.g., Toroyan v. Barrett, 495 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that
the "Second Circuit has consistently treated Justice Black's opinion ... in Commonwealth
Coatings as dicta and rejected the appearance of bias standard").
76. See Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 420-21 (1992)
(discussing the origins of the Marks rule).
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the opinion given precedential weight should be the one that expresses the
narrowest grounds on which a majority can be reached.77
The Court in Marks recognized, in a case that found a Massachusetts
obscenity law to be unconstitutional, that three opinions constituting the
majority of the Court were irreconcilable. 78  Because of a lack of a clear
majority regarding the constitutional standard that controlled, the Court
followed the decision based on the "narrowest grounds," that of those
supporting a three-part test. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's ruling in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co., is an example of a
lower court interpreting Commonwealth Coatings as a plurality opinion and
applying the Marks rule to give weight to Justice White's opinion. 80 In
77. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that "[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds"' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976))); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (stating that "the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds").
The Marks Court struggled to interpret its previous decision in A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966), in which the Court rendered a plurality decision regarding the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts obscenity statute. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193-94. The interpretation of Memoirs was
necessary because there the five justices composing the majority disagreed regarding the
constitutional standard that should be used to decide if the material at issue was obscene. See
Thurmon, supra note 76, at 458 n. 175. Six Justices determined that the Massachusetts obscenity
law was unconstitutional; however, one opinion in the plurality, endorsed by three Justices,
supported a three-part test for obscenity, while two Justices "believed that all speech was
protected, even obscenity." Id. (characterizing the Court's decisions in Memoirs). Justice
Stewart felt that only "hardcore pornography" should be suppressed. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193
(citing Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
78. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193-94.
79. Id. at 193.
80. See generally Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 644 n.5 (6th
Cir. 2005) (explaining that the concurrence by Justice White should be viewed as a narrower
holding than Justice Black's opinion). For another case similarly decided see Ormsbee
Development Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 1982). There, a lessee (Grace)
appealed the decision from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, which
had confirmed an arbitration decision in favor of the lessor (Santa Fe). Id. at 1142. The lease the
parties entered into contained an arbitration clause covering disagreements over whether the lease
terms had been breached, allowing the lease to be forfeited. Id. at 1142-43. The lease terms
stated the following:
Lessee shall not subject Lessor or the leased premises to any liability or lien for or on
account of any work done .. .upon said premises, and if by reason of the failure of
Lessee to pay bills or expenses incurred by Lessee, any lien or liens shall be filed
against the leased premises .... Lessor may also at its election declare a forfeiture of
this Lease and Agreement.
Id. at 1142-43.
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
Nationwide, the court interpreted Justice White's remarks, which disagreed
with the idea that arbitrators should be held to the same standards as Article III
judges, as removing his endorsement of Justice Black's "appearance of bias"
standard.8' The court then used this apparent discrepancy between Justice
Black and Justice White's language to characterize the appearance of bias
discussion in Justice Black's opinion merely as dicta.8 2 In so doing, the court
implicitly applied the Marks rule, determining that Justice White's opinion was
more narrowly crafted and thus controlled. 3 The Nationwide court went on to
hold that because the Supreme Court majority has not adopted an "appearance
of bias" standard, to vacate an award for "evident partiality," the "alleged
partiality must be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration," and that the
party alleging the partiality bears the burden of establishing facts indicative of
partiality.
Courts that support the "actual bias" standard do so by noting that
arbitrators, unlike judges, are often active members of the community in which
they arbitrate.85 Elaborating on Justice White's point that arbitrators are "men
of affairs, not apart from but of the marketplace," 86 the lower courts have
Arbitration commenced, each party selected an arbitrator, and the American Association of
Arbitrators selected the third "neutral" arbitrator. Id. at 1144. The arbitrators ruled, in a two-to-
one decision that the actions of Grace terminated the lease, per the lease agreement. Id.
Santa Fe moved to confirm the award and Grace moved to vacate the decision on the grounds
that the "neutral" arbitrator had demonstrated evident partiality in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 10(b)
by failing to disclose a prior relationship between the arbitrator and the law firm representing
Santa Fe; specifically, Grace alleged that the arbitrator actively represented a company involved
in a partnership between two other companies, one of which is represented by Santa Fe's law
firm. Id. There were other connections between the arbitrator and Santa Fe's law firm, but those
had been disclosed in a resume the arbitrator provided to the parties before commencing the
arbitration. Id.
After considering the facts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
while "[a]rbitrators are, of course, obligated to disclose possible bias ... only clear evidence of
impropriety . . . justifies the denial of summary confirmation of an arbitration award." Id at
1147. The court relied on Justice White's opinion and the background rule that arbitration awards
should be final and confirmed absent "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 1146-47 (citing Fizer v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1978)). The court went so far as to say that
"evidence of bias or interest of an arbitrator must be direct, definite, and capable of
demonstration." Id. at 1147. It concluded by finding that because no direct financial involvement
between the neutral arbitrator and either of the parties did not exist, the appellant "fail[ed] to
establish exceptional circumstances" necessary to vacate the ruling. Id. at 1151-52.
81. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d at 644 n.5.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 645 (accepting that Justice Black's "appearance of bias standard espoused in the
plurality opinion in Commonwealth Coatings" was merely dicta).
84. Id. at 645 (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers, 48
F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir.1995)).
85. See, e.g., Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the use of arbitrators is often preferable because of
their expertise in the community).
86. Commonwealth Coatings v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (White, J., concurring).
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found that applying an "appearance of bias" standard would severely decrease,
if not totally hinder, qualified arbitrators from arbitrating.
87
2. The Black Team: Courts Supporting the "Appearance of Bias " Standard
Other courts read Commonwealth Coatings as support for the proposition
that proof of "actual bias" is not required to vacate an arbitration decision
under 9 U.S.C. 4 10.88 Schmitz v. Zilveti is the most prominent and well cited
of these cases.8  There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that courts that interpret Commonwealth Coatings as
requiring "actual bias" have misinterpreted the case.90 According to the Ninth
Circuit, because Justice White "said he joined in the 'majority opinion' but
wrote to make 'additional remarks,"' Justice Black's opinion in
87. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d at 647 ("[T]o disqualify any arbitrator who
had professional dealings with one of the parties (to say nothing of a social acquaintanceship)
would make it impossible, in some circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator at all." (alteration
in original) (quoting Morelite Constr. Co., 748 F.2d at 83)).
88. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Consistent with
Commonwealth Coatings, courts examining nondisclosure cases have not required proof of actual
bias in showing 'evident partiality."'). The court in Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Indus. specifically
explained that:
Although not endorsing the view that arbitrators should be held to as high standards as
judges and therefore be required to disqualify themselves in all instances in which a
judge would have been required to do so, Mr. Justice White did endorse the Court's
position that extensive disclosure must be made by each arbitrator prior to the
arbitration.
495 F.2d 1260, 1263 (2d Cir. 1973).
In Schmitz, the parties brought their dispute before National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) arbitrators, as dictated by their contract. Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1044. NASD requires
arbitrators "to 'disclose to the Director of Arbitration any circumstances which might preclude
such arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determination."' Id. (quoting
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 23(a)
(1990) [hereinafter NASD CODE]). NASD required this disclosure of any "financial, business,
professional, family, or social relationships that are likely to affect impartiality or might
reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias." Id (quoting NASD CODE § 23(a)(2)).
All three arbitrators selected to hear the case "completed a disclosure form" listing all matters
they believed had to be disclosed. Id. After an award had been rendered, the losing party learned
that one of the arbitrators' law firms had represented the parent company of the victorious party
in nineteen cases over thrity-five years. Id The arbitrator at issue had run a conflicts check on
the parties to the arbitration, but not on their parent companies, even though he was aware of the
parent companies. Id.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the arbitrator had a duty under the NASD Code to disclose
the prior relationship with the victorious party and that the failure to inform the other party
constituted "evident partiality." Id. at 1049. As a result, the arbitration decision was vacated
under FAA § 10(a)(2). Id at 1049-50.
89. Cf Positive Software Solutions, Inc., v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive
Software 1), 436 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that Schmitz is cited for the proposition
"that the 'best expression' of the Supreme Court's holding is that evident partiality exists when
'undisclosed facts show a reasonable impression of partiality').
90. Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1045.
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
Commonwealth Coatings is a majority opinion. 91 Therefore, the argument is
that courts are not required to 9ive weight to Justice White's additional
remarks in his concurring opinion.
However, the Ninth Circuit went on to state that the same conclusion can be
reached even while accounting for Justice White's concurrence. 93 The court
reasoned that even though Justice White specifically rejected the notion that
arbitrators should be held to the same standards of conduct applicable to
Article III judges, he never "expressly reject[ed] the 'appearance of bias
language"' in Justice Black's opinion. In contrast to the strict requirement
that Article III judges recuse themselves when there is an appearance of bias,
arbitrators are required merely to disclose possible conflicts, not recuse
themselves from the proceedings. 95 In Schmitz, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
conflict between the approach taken by Justice White and Justice Black
"dissipates when one recalls that the context in which arbitrators and judges
operate and the functions they perform differ."
96
In reaching its conclusion, the Schmitz court relied heavily on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in Sanko S.S. Co. v.97
Cook Industries. In Sanko, the court concluded that Justice White's
concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings "did endorse [Justice Black's]
position that extensive disclosure must be made by each arbitrator prior to the
arbitration." 98 The Second Circuit remanded the case to determine whether thearbitrator failed to disclose any connections with a party, and, if so, whether
91. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.s. at 150 (White, J., concurring)).
92. Id. at 1045-46.
93. Id. at 1046 (stating that the court did "not rest [its] decision on any conflict Justice
White's concurrence may have with the Commonwealth Coatings majority opinion").
94. Id. (The court specifically stated that "[t]hough the concurrence may show an apparent
contradiction, the conflict dissipates when one recalls that the context in which arbitrators and
judges operate and the functions they perform differ. Expert arbitrators will nearly always, of
necessity, have numerous contacts within their field of expertise.").
95. Id. at 1046-47 ("[T]he actual standard for arbitrators does differ from that for judges,
even though the language used to describe both standards may be similar."); see also 9 U.S.C. §
10(a)(2) (2000) (providing no grounds for vacatur based on an arbitrator's failure to disclose).
Furthermore, the court noted the analytical difference between cases alleging actual bias on the
part of the arbitrator and those that alleged the reasonable impression of bias. Schmitz, 20 F.3d at
1047.
96. Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1046 (emphasizing that "[e]xpert arbitrators will nearly always ...
have numerous contacts within their field of expertise").
97. See id. (citing Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Indus., 495 F.2d 1260 (2d Cir. 1973)). In Sanko,
the court ruled that a ship owner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if an
arbitration award in favor of the charter of his ship should be vacated due to the arbitrator's
failure to disclose business connections with the charter's lawyer. Sanko, 495 F.2d at 1261.
98. Sanko, 495 F.2d at 1263. The court went on to differentiate the case from Cook
Industries v. C. Itoh & Co., 449 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1971), because in Cook, the party alleging
undisclosed connections on the part of the arbitrator should have known of the connections before
arbitration because of the limited people involved in the local industry. Id. at 1264-65.
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those connections were substantial enough to "have raised doubts concerning
[the arbitrator's] impartiality and should have been revealed." 99
Schmitz also cited Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., which distinguished
cases that concerned an arbitrator with significant connections to one of the
parties from cases that involved relatively insubstantial connections.' ° The
court first scrutinized the facts of the case looking for any "evident partiality,"
which it defined as a relationship "that might reasonably give rise to an
appearance of partiality."'' 1 Finding none, the court examined the record to
uncover any evidence of actual bias by the arbitrator, which it said "'must be
direct, definite, and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or
speculative."
0 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also
interpreted Commonwealth Coatings to mean that an arbitration award can be
vacated where a neutral arbitrator has failed to disclose facts creating the
appearance of bias, even in the absence of an arbitrator's actual conflict of
interest.'t 3 The court reached this decision by analyzing, in addition to the
FAA, the Florida Arbitration Code, which has a similar rule allowing vacatur
of an arbitration decision because of "evident partiality."'
10 4
99. Id. at 1263, 1264 n.3.
100. Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating
that a highly speculative allegation of bias was insufficient for either actual bias or the appearance
of bias). The court first dismissed the plaintiff's possible bias claim by noting that
Commonwealth Coatings does not dictate a contrary result because that case dealt with "the
failure to disclose relationships that might reasonably give rise to an appearance of partiality,"
whereas the present case involved no significant relationship and disclosure by the arbitrator. Id.
at 1199-1200. The court stated that the bias standard, not the "evident partiality" standard, is that
of an "'interest or bias of an arbitrator [which is] direct, definite, and capable of demonstration
rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative."' Id. at 1200 (quoting U.S. Wrestling Fed'n v.
Wrestling Div. of the AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 318 (7th Cir. 1979)).
101. Id. at 1200-02.
102. Id. at 1200 (quoting U.S. Wrestling Fed'n, 605 F.2d at 318) (concluding that the
"possibility of bias was highly speculative" because the arbitrator has disclosed the conflict and
removed himself from the proceedings as soon as the conflict arose).
103. Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11 th
Cir. 2002) (stating that "evident partiality" can exist when the arbitrator is aware of conflicts and
fails to disclose them); see also Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir.
1996) ("Whether the arbitrator's decision itself is faulty is not necessarily relevant.").
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13(l)(b) (West 2003) (mandating that "[ulpon application of a
party, the court shall vacate an award when: . . . [t]here was evident partiality by an arbitrator
appointed as neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or umpire or misconduct prejudicing
the rights of any party").
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II. POSITIVE SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS
Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortgage (Positive Software I1)
represents the Fifth Circuit's most recent attempt to interpret and apply the
Supreme Court's Commonwealth Coatings rule.1
0?
A. The Basics
The case arose out of a dispute between two companies, Positive Software
Solutions, Inc. and New Century Mortgage Corporation, both of which are
involved in the mortgage industry. °6 As agreed to in their contract, the parties
submitted their dispute to the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
10 7
They then participated in a seven-day arbitration hearing before the
105. Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software 11),
476 F.3d 278, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing the plaintiffs allegations that vacatur
should be granted due to the fact that "'there was evident partiality' in the arbitrator" (quoting 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2000))).
106. Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software 1), 436
F.3d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, Positive Software II, 476 F.3d 278. New Century
sells mortgages while Positive Software "develops, markets, and manufactures computer-software
products for the mortgage industry." Id.
Positive Software developed a new database software program and licensed it to New Century
"pursuant to a Software Subscription Agreement." Id. During the course of business between the
two companies, a dispute arose regarding whether New Century's use of the software was within
the scope of the licensing agreement. Id. Positive Software alleged that New Century was
copying the software and incorporating it into its own programs in violation of the licensing
agreement. Id.
Positive Software sued on claims of "copyright infringement, theft of trade secrets, [and]
breach of contract." Id. In April 2003, the district court granted Positive Software a preliminary
injunction to prevent New Century from continuing to use the software, but ordered arbitration to
resolve the dispute in accordance with the terms of the licensing agreement. Positive Software II,
476 F.3d at 279.
107. Positive Software 1, 436 F.3d at 496. The parties then "jointly selected" the arbitrator
from a list provided by the AAA. Id. at 497. The AAA provided the parties with a list of
arbitrators, along with their curricula vitae, and asked them to rank the arbitrators in order of
preference. Peter J. Shurn received the highest combined ranking and was selected by the parties
to arbitrate the case. Id.
The AAA informed Shurn of his selection, gave Shum a list of the parties, the firms
representing the parties, and their specific counsel, and reminded Shum to disclose any
connections he had to the parties. Id. The reminder specifically stated that Shum had an
"obligation to disclose any circumstances likely to affect impartiality or create an appearance of
partiality." Id.
The court also found of note that the same reminder appeared at the bottom of two additional
letters sent to Shurn regarding the case prior to arbitration. Id. Furthermore, Shum signed a
standard AAA "Notice of Appointment" form, asking him to disclose any "past or present
relationship with the parties, their counsel, or potential witnesses, direct or indirect, whether
financial, professional, social, or any other kind." Id The letter also specifically asked Shurn if
he had "any professional or social relationship with counsel for any party in [the] proceeding or
with the firms for which they work[.]" Id. He indicated that he did not. Id.
[Vol. 58:599
Why Positive Software II was Wrongly Decided
arbitrator.' 08  Shortly thereafter, the arbitrator issued a written ruling in favor
of New Century on all counts.10 9 After the decision, Positive Software
discovered that the arbitrator and his former law firm had represented the same
party as New Century's counsel in prior litigation.110 Consequently, Positive
Software filed a motion to vacate the award.'lf
In September of 2004, the district court granted the motion to vacate because
the previously undisclosed relationship between the arbitrator and New
Century created "an appearance of partiality.""12 The case was then appealed
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
13
B. Three to Zero for Black: Positive Software I
A three-judge panel of the appellate court analyzed the opinions of
Commonwealth Coatings along with many of the cases interpreting and
applying its holding.1 4 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
finding that the arbitrator's "past professional relationship with [opposing
counsel] might have conveyed an impression of possible partiality to a
108. Id. at 497.
109. Id. The arbitrator gave no award to Positive Software, but awarded New Century
$11,500 on its counterclaim and $1.5 million in fees associated with the litigation and arbitration.
Positive Software 11, 476 F.3d at 280.
110. Positive Software II, 476 F.3d at 280. Shurn had previously worked for Arnold, White,
& Durkee. Id. While there, he, along with many others, represented Intel Corporation in a patent
litigation issue. Id. Also representing Intel in the same action was Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., New
Century's counsel of record. Id. In addition, "[o]ne of Susman Godfrey's attorneys in the New
Century arbitration, Ophelia Camina, had [also] been involved in the Intel litigation." Id. The
court went on to note that "[a]lthough their names appeared together on pleadings, Shum and
Camina never attended or participated in any meetings, telephone calls, hearings, depositions, or
trials together." Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. (reciting how the district court found "that Shurn failed to disclose 'a significant
prior relationship with New Century's counsel'). The Fifth Circuit explained the district court's
holding and rationale:
[A]ny reasonable lawyer selecting a sole arbitrator for arbitration would have wanted to
know that the arbitrator chosen had a prior association with opposing counsel, given the
contentious nature of the dispute between the parties and the duration and importance
of the prior litigation with which both arbitrator and opposing counsel were associated.
Therefore, Shum's failure to disclose his prior relationship with opposing counsel
created a reasonable impression of possible partiality that warranted vacating the
award. The district court also held that Positive Software did not learn of Shurn's prior
professional relationship until after the arbitration and, therefore, did not waive its
objection to the nondisclosure.
Positive Software I, 436 F.3d at 498 (footnotes omitted).
113. Positive Software 1, 436 F.3d at 496. The case was heard by an appellate panel
consisting of Judges Reavley, Garza, and Benavides; Judge Reavley issued the unanimous
opinion of the court. Id.
114. Id. at499-502.
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reasonable person."' 15 Although New Century argued that a finding of evident
impartiality in this case would make it more difficult to find arbitrators, the
court disagreed, explaining that arbitrators with past relations to the parties are
not automatically disqualified; rather, they must disclose the connections to all
parties involved, who may then decide to waive the connection."
16
Similar to Commonwealth Coatings, the court in Positive Software I noted
that it did not find any bias or corruption on the part of the arbitrator, merely a
failure to disclose as required by both the AAA rules governing the proceeding
and 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). 1 7 The court reasoned that "such relationships must
be disclosed to the parties if the integrity and effectiveness of the arbitration
process is to be preserved." 1 8  Furthermore, the court held that Positive
Software did not waive the nondisclosure issue at any time because Positive
Software had no actual knowledge of the relationship between the arbitrator
and New Century.
119
C. Eleven to Five for White: Positive Software II
Following the panel decision in Positive Software I, New Century sought
and obtained an en banc review by the Fifth Circuit. 12  Sixteen Fifth Circuit
judges heard the case, and eleven joined an opinion, written by Chief Judge
Jones, reversing the previous decision and refusing to vacate the arbitration
decision because the undisclosed relationship was not "a significant
compromising relationship."' 12' The majority opinion began by noting that
Webster's Dictionary defines "[p]artiality" as "bias," and "evident" as "clear to
the vision or understanding."I The opinion noted that the previous panel
decision in Positive Software I ignored the straightforward language that
seemed to indicate that arbitral awards should be upheld "unless bias was
clearly evident."' 23 The court also acknowledged that the Supreme Court has
115. Id at 504. ("It is not hard to think that Positive Software might not want to employ [the
arbitrator's] services in an arbitration hearing with New Century once it discovered [the
arbitrator's] prior relationship with the law firm and counsel representing New Century. On the
other hand, Positive Software might decide that Shum's qualifications as an arbitrator outweigh
whatever concerns it might have. The point is simply that the information should have been
disclosed to Positive Software so that it could make that decision. The integrity of the arbitral
process demands no less.").
116. Id.
117. Id. at 503-04.
118. Id. at 504.
119. Id. at 505.
120. Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software I1),
476 F.3d 278, 280 (5th Cir. 2007) (en bane).
121. ld. at279,286.
122. Id. at 281 (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 430 (1985)).
123. Id.
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already attempted to lend its own interpretation to the phrase "evident
partiality," and that this interpretation was controlling.
124
The court then addressed the recurring issue of just what is the controlling
holding of Commonwealth Coatings.125  The court noted that while Justice
Black and Justice White agreed that the arbitrator in that case demonstrated
evident partiality, the two Justices did not agree on a standard to be used in
making such a determination.126 As a result, the court determined that Justice
White's "joinder" of Justice Black's opinion is "magnanimous but significantly
qualified."1 27 Therefore, the court concluded that Justice White's concurring
opinion rendered Justice Black's opinion a plurality opinion and because
Justice White's opinion was narrower in scope, it should be given precedential
weight.'
28
The court in Positive Software II emphasized that "evident partiality" cannot
be based on an arbitrator's undisclosed "trivial or insubstantial prior
relationship" with one of the parties. 129  The court concluded that the
"'reasonable impression of bias' standard [should be] interpreted practically
rather than with utmost rigor.,130  The court applied its interpretation of
"evident partiality" to the facts of the case and found that the connection





126. Id. at 282 (stating that Justice Black "use[d] an egregious set of facts as the vehicle to
require broad disclosure of 'any . . . possible bias,'" whereas Justice White hew[ed] "closely to
the facts" to find evident partiality, stating that evident partiality requires more than just an
undisclosed "trivial business" connection between the parties).
127. Id. The court found that allowing vacatur based on "mere appearance of bias" would
not just hold arbitrators to the standards of Article III judges (a view explicitly rejected by Justice
White in Commonwealth Coatings), but would also actually hold arbitrators to an even higher
standard than that to which Article III judges are held. Id. at 285. The court noted that if a
relationship similar to the one at issue Positive Software I existed between a judge and a lawyer,
disclosure or recusal would not even be suggested. Id.
The court based its logic on Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., where the Fifth Circuit
stated that the fact that a judge once represented one of the defendants in the case did not require
his disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because in that specific circumstance, no one could
reasonably question his impartiality. 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982). The court found the
connection between judge and party to be "too remote and too innocuous to warrant
disqualification." Id. As referenced in Chitimacha, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) clearly states that any
"judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. §455(a) (2000).
128. Positive Software II, 476 F.3d at 282 (finding that because Justice White's opinion was
"based on a narrower ground.. . it becomes the Court's effective ratio decidendi").
129. 1d. at 283.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 284-85 ("No case we have discovered in research or briefs has come close to
vacating an arbitration award for nondisclosure of such a slender connection between the
arbitrator and a party's counsel."). The court believed that the facts of Positive Software H
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The court supported its decision by showing that allowing vacatur would
damage three of the main goals of arbitration, namely that arbitration decisions
be timely, have finality, and be decided by experts in the industry.
1 32
Specifically, the court found that allowing vacatur in these instances would
lead to a rise in litigation, thereby destroying the speed and finality of
arbitrations.133 Additionally, a holding for Positive Software would deprive
the arbitration process of its best arbitrators because those with the most
expertise and specialized knowledge generally have numerous contacts in the
field, thus creating contacts with many parties likely to seek arbitration. 134
D. They Got It Wrong: The Dissent in Positive Software II
The dissent in Positive Software II disagreed with both the result reached by
the majority and its understanding of "evident partiality" as the Supreme Court
interpreted the term in Commonwealth Coatings.135  Writing for the dissent,
Judge Reavley first provided his interpretation of the Commonwealth Coatings
decision to demonstrate how the majority departed from the Supreme Court's
reasoning. 36 He asserted that the majority, like many previous courts giving
controlling weight to Justice White's concurrence, failed to explain how
Justice Black and Justice White's opinions are "irreconcilable."' 37 As a result,
the dissent viewed Justice Black's opinion as a majority opinion, rather than a
plurality, and therefore concluded that is should be given the force of legal
precedent. 138
"1pale[d] in comparison" to those cases where the court has granted vacatur for evident partiality,
including both Commonwealth Coatings and Schmitz. Id. at 284.
132. Id. at 285-86 (finding that vacating this decision would deprive arbitration of three of its
core values: speed, finality, and expertise).
133. Id. at 285.
134. Id. at 285-86 ("[R]equiring vacatur on these attenuated facts would rob arbitration of
one of its most attractive features ... expertise. Arbitration would lose the benefit of specialized
knowledge, because the best lawyers and professionals, who normally have the longest lists of
potential connections to disclose, have no need to risk blemishes on their reputations from post-
arbitration lawsuits attacking them as biased.").
135. Id. at 286-88 (Reavley, J., dissenting). Applying the facts of the case, the dissent also
criticized the majority's portrayal of the relationship between the arbitrator and New Century's
counsel as "trivial." Id. at 290.
136. Id. at 286-87.
137. Id. at 288 ("Aside from Justice White's statement that he was glad to join the majority
opinion and the substance of his remarks, Justice White did not articulate an alternative rationale.
Justice White merely stated what the Court did not hold, which is not inconsistent with the
majority opinion.").
138. Id. at 287. The dissent relied heavily on the reasoning in Schmitz to conclude that
Commonwealth Coatings was not a plurality decision. Id. at 288. The dissent also criticized the
majority for duplicating the error made by other courts that interpreted Commonwealth Coatings
by confusing the standard used in cases of actual bias and cases of failure to disclose. Id. (stating
that "[tihe Ninth Circuit correctly distinguished cases of bias or appearance of bias and failure to
disclose").
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Judge Reavley acknowledged the majority's concern over protecting the
finality of arbitral awards, but determined that this concern "does not justify
evading the law of the Supreme Court by misstating it or by avoiding it by
bleaching the evidence of possible partiality."' 39  Furthermore, the dissent
argued that arbitrator partiality should not be sacrificed in order to minimize
litigation expenses and ensure finality of arbitral awards.' 40 In the dissent's
view, the Court's decision in Commonwealth Coatings stressed protecting the
integrity of the arbitral process by ensuring the impartiality of arbitrators.'
4 1
As Judge Reavley stated, "it is the protection and reassurance of the party that
matters most," thus elevating impartiality over finality.
142
Judge Wiener joined Judge Reavley's dissent, but wrote a separate opinion
stressing the key differences between selection of an arbitrator as opposed to
an Article III judge, and urging that this difference should affect the
interpretation of Commonwealth Coatings. 143 He noted that a judge is assigned
by the court, whereas an arbitrator is chosen directly by the parties or their
representatives; therefore, the disclosure of possible sources of bias on the part
of the arbitrator is far more significant than any possible bias of a judge.
44
Accordingly, Judge Wiener concluded that Justice White's remarks
regarding the different standards applicable to arbitrators and Article III judges
had nothing to do with "the immutable prerequisite that, before the parties sign
off on a candidate for arbitrator, they must have received from him an
unexpurgated disclosure of absolutely every past or present relationship with
the parties and their lawyers."'' 45  In fact, according to Judge Wiener,
Commonwealth Coatings did not decide or even reach the question of whether
139. Id.
140. Id. Judge Reavley favored a standard that requires the disclosure of an arbitrator's
possible connections or bias because he felt that proving actual bias was difficult or impossible to
do. Id. In his concurrence with the dissent, Judge Wiener further articulated this point by stating:
The informalities attendant on proceedings in arbitration come at the cost of the
protections automatically afforded to parties in court, which reside in such venerable
institutions as the rules of evidence and civil procedure. Likewise sacrificed at the altar
of quick and economical finality is virtually the entire system of appellate review, as
largely embodied for the federal courts in rules of appellate procedure and the
constantly growing body of trial, appellate, and Supreme Court precedent interpreting
and applying such rules. By dispensing with such basic standards of review as clearly
erroneous, de novo, and abuse of discretion, there remain to parties in arbitration only
the narrowest of appellate recourse.
Id. at 292-93 (Wiener, J., concurring with dissent).
141. Id. at 287 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (finding that the six justices in Commonwealth
Coatings agreed that impartiality and fairness of the arbitrator was paramount).
142. Id. at 288.
143. Id. at 291 (Wiener, J., concurring with dissent).
144. Id. at 291-92 ("These general and particular differences underscore why such full and
fair disclosure by a potential arbitrator of every conceivable relationship with a party or counsel,
however slight, is a prerequisite." (emphasis added)).
145. Id. at291.
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"arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial decorum of Article III
judges." 146 Rather, the proper emphasis should be on whether the arbitrator
made sufficient disclosures.1 47  For this very reason, arbitrators are not
"automatically disqualified by a business relationship" with the parties before
them. If the relationship is properly disclosed,14 Judge Wiener interpreted
Justice White's concurrence as clearly standing for the proposition that
arbitrators have an absolute duty to disclose all past relationships.
III. THE ERRONEOUS RULING BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT IN POSITIVE SOFTWARE H
A. An Opportunity Missed
When the Fifth Circuit accepted the panel decision in Positive Software I for
en banc review, it had an opportunity to clarify how courts should interpret the
"evident partiality" standard provided by FAA § 10(a)(2).150 However, instead
of adopting a workable rule of law that could be applied with reasonable
predictability, the court offered only the vague guidance that "Justice White's
opinion [should be read] holistically."'
' 51
On its surface, the opinion appears to have avoided deciding which
Commonwealth Coatings opinion should be given precedential weight.' 52 The
court adopts a hybrid of the two judicial camps, those allowing vacatur for the
appearance of bias and those requiring actual bias.' 53  A close reading,
however, uncovers a decision that deploys the Marks rule to give precedential
146. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150
(1968) (White, J., concurring)).
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring)).
149. Id. at 291-92 (positing that "Justice White meant much more, at least regarding the
absolute nature of the duty of a potential arbitrator to disclose every relationship large and small.
This is because he and the other justices who joined the Black opinion knew full well who it is
that has the sole authority and duty to determine whether a candidate for the post of arbitrator
should be accepted or rejected: the parties and they alone").
150. See id. at 280-81 (contemplating the meaning of "evidence partiality"). The court
recognized that although an interpretation of Commonwealth Coatings is critical to defining the
term, that there is much disagreement among courts regarding the holding of the case. Id. at 281-
83.
151. Id. at 283.
152. See id. at 281-82. While the majority cites to numerous decisions asserting that Justice
White's opinion in Commonwealth Coatings is controlling, Chief Judge Jones concluded that a
failure to disclose may justify a finding of "evident partiality," but that a finding of actual bias is
not required to justify vacatur based on evident partiality. See id. at 282-83. However, this point
is added with a caveat that "the better interpretation of Commonwealth Coatings is that which
reads Justice White's opinion holistically." Id. at 283.
153. See id. at 282 (advancing a hybrid of the two Commonwealth Coatings opinions by
allowing arbitration decisions to be overturned due to the "reasonable impression of bias"
standard, while still finding that Justice White's opinion should be followed).
[Vol. 58:599
Why Positive Software II was Wrongly Decided
authority to Justice White's opinion. 154 In attempting to articulate a rule of
law based on Justice White's concurrence, the Fifth Circuit set a more
demanding standard for "evident partiality,"' 155 while acknowledging that
Justice White was not purporting to advocate for a rule that restricted the
"actual bias" standard.15
B. Justice Black Authored a Majority Decision
Chief Judge Jones, who authored the en banc majority opinion in Positive
Software II, was correct in finding that Justice White's concurrence in
Commonwealth Coatings does not, as found by many of the circuits, endorse
an "actual bias" standard. 157  In Commonwealth Coatings, there was no
allegation of actual bias on the part of the arbitrator. 158 In order for Justice
White to have agreed with Justice Black on the appropriate disposition of the
case, he must have agreed that the standard for vacatur is less strict than the
"actual bias" requirement. Otherwise, he would not have been able to join the
majority. 1
59
However, Chief Judge Jones was incorrect in applying the Marks rule to
Commonwealth Coatings and in concluding that Justice White's opinion
should be the controlling opinion. Just as the Fifth Circuit began its
interpretation of "evident partiality" by analyzing the plain language of the
statute, any analysis of Justice White's intent should begin with the plain
language in his concurring opinion. 160 Justice White himself said "I am glad to
154. See id. at 282. The majority in Positive Software II followed Justice White's
concurrence. Id. at 282-83. To do this, the court had to apply the Marks rule after finding that
the rationales behind Justice Black and Justice White's opinions were different. See supra notes
76-79 and accompanying text.
155. See Positive Software I1, 476 F.3d at 283 (stating, based on Justice White's opinion, that
"[t]he resulting standard is that in nondisclosure cases, an award may not be vacated because of a
trivial or insubstantial prior relationship between the arbitrator and the parties").
156. See id. at 282 ("Justice White ... supports an ample but not unrealistic disclosure, and
he supports a cautious approach to vacatur for nondisclosure.").
157. Compare id. at 283 (noting that Justice White's position on "actual bias" was in fact, "a
reasonable impression of bias" standard, interpreted "practically"), with Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co.
v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Justice White's
concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings for the proposition that "a mere appearance of bias is
insufficient to demonstrate evident partiality," thus seemingly asserting that Justice White
endorsed the actual bias standard).
158. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968)
(stating that the Court had "no reason, apart from the undisclosed business relationship, to suspect
[the arbitrator of having] any improper motives").
159. See Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2004) (implying that
because of the importance of disclosure, Justice White also believed that "actual bias" was not
necessary to vacate an arbitration decision for "evident partiality").
160. See Positive Software 11, 476 F.3d at 281 (reading literally Justice White's statement
about his desire to join Justice Black's opinion).
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join my Brother Black's opinion." '161 "Glad" is defined as "pleased," and
"join" is defined as "to come into the company of.'' 162 Therefore, "glad to
join," on its face, appears to be Justice White's indication that he was pleased
to come into the company of Justice Black's opinion.
Even if one disregards Justice White's initial language, it is still incorrect to
classify Commonwealth Coatings as a plurality and apply the Marks rule to
give precedential weight to Justice White's opinion. In Marks, the Court
illustrated the difference between a plurality decision and a concurrence to a
majority decision to set the rule for how lower courts should interpret plurality
decisions.' 63  The Marks Court explained that in a prior case, Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, the three different opinions constituting a plurality agreed upon
the result, but differed greatly as to the standard that should be used to define
obscene material. 64 To devise a rationale from the three opinions, the Court
looked to the narrowest common rationale. 165  In other words, the Court
implied that the Marks rule should only be invoked when the plurality opinions
cannot all agree on a rationale.
166
Contrary to the Justices in Marks, Justices Black and White agree on the
rationale of the decision: that arbitrators must disclose possible sources of bias
to the parties involved in the arbitration before its commencement.'
67
Furthermore, Justice White does not take issue with Justice Black's broad
characterization that § 10 shows the "desire of Congress to provide not merely
for any arbitration but for an impartial one."'
16 8
While Justice White's remarks that arbitrators are not to be held to the same
standards as Article III judges may be read as a divergence from Justice
Black's opinion,' 69 Justice White's opinion should be read in full to clearly
161. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
162. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 493, 630 (10th ed. 2003).
163. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
164. See Marks discussion supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
165. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
166. See id.
167. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
(calling for broad disclosure "of any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias");
id. at 152 (White, J., concurring) (emphasizing that arbitrators should "err on the side of
disclosure").
168. Id. at 147 (plurality opinion).
169. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 644 n.5 (6th Cir. 2005)
(noting that Justice White "concurred in the result, but declined to hold that arbitrators are to be
held to the standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges"); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of
N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Justice White explained that subjecting arbitrators
to extremely rigorous disclosure obligations would diminish one of the key benefits of arbitration:
an arbitrator's familiarity with the parties' business."); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that Justice White found arbitrators to be
"men of affairs" and thus it would be paradoxical to hold them to the same standards as detached
Article III judges); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1984) (indicating that Justice Black's opinion is dicta, and reiterating
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understand the significance of these remarks. Justice White explained later in
his concurrence that the reason he wants to be clear that arbitrators should be
held to different standards than judges is so that their previous connections
with the community do not automatically preclude them from taking part in the
proceedings.170  If the arbitrator discloses the relationship -beforehand, he
should not be excluded.1 71  This statement does not alter Justice Black's
holding that the "arbitration process [has the] simple requirement that
arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression
of possible bias."
172
The concurrence concluded that the "law requires the disclosure" so that
parties to arbitration can be the "architects of their own arbitration process,"
and freely accept or reject the arbitrator based upon their own knowledge of
"ethical standards and reputations within their business."'173 Therefore, Justice
Black and Justice White do not disagree on the rationale underlying the
decisions in Commonwealth Coatings, rather, both Justices believe that unlike
judges, arbitrators are allowed to have connections to the parties over which
they preside as long as they disclose these relationships.
174
the statement of Justice White, that arbitrators cannot be held to the same standard as judges
because they are more connected to the community they are adjudicating over); Merit Ins. Co. v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that Justice White's opinion
controls and did not believe that arbitrators should be held to the same standards as Article III
judges).
170. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. Justice White explained that unlike Article III judges,
arbitrators are not to be excluded from an arbitration proceeding because they have had a previous
relationship with one of the parties, as a federal judge would be. Commonwealth Coatings, 393
U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
171. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (stating that a difference between
arbitrators and judges is that "arbitrators are not automatically disqualified by a business
relationship with the parties before them if both parties are informed of the relationship in
advance"). "
172. Id. at 149 (plurality opinion). Furthermore, Justice White goes as far as to say that an
arbitrator will not be "automatically disqualified" for having a previous relationship with one of
the parties when "[both parties] are unaware of the facts [and] the relationship is trivial." Id. at
150 (White, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 151.
174. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.
1991), aff'd in part and revd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) ("Marks stands for . . . [the]
proposition [that] the controlling opinion in a splintered decision is that of the Justice or Justices
who concur on the 'narrowest grounds"'). The Third Circuit specifically stated that when a
Justice "concurring in the judgment in such a case articulates a legal standard which, when
applied, will necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would
agree that standard is the law of the land." Id. at 693.
Judge Wiener perhaps puts this best by stating that "Justice White meant much more [than
what courts credit him for] at least regarding the absolute nature of the duty of a potential
arbitrator to disclose every relationship large and small." Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v.
New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software 11), 476 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(Wiener, J., concurring with dissent). Judge Wiener further proved this point by illustrating
additional differences between judges and arbitrators:
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that "[t]he draconian remedy of vacatur
is only warranted upon nondisclosure that involves a significant compromising
relationship"' 175 is completely at odds with the rationale supporting the
opinions of both Justice Black and Justice White. 176 The Fifth Circuit reached
this decision by incorrectly giving excessive weight to Justice White's
concurrence and ignoring the ratio decidendi of the Court as expressed by
Justice Black. 177 Instead, the "reasonable impression of bias" standard requires
arbitrators to disclose any relationship that would raise concerns about a
possible bias.
178
C. The Facts Demonstrate that the Arbitrator's Decision Should Have Been
Vacated
Just as the panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals initially found in
Positive Software I, applying the correct "evident partiality" standard as
interpreted by Commonwealth Coatings requires vacatur of the arbitrator's
decision. The arbitrator and the co-lead counsel for New Century had both
previously represented the same client at the same time in the same matter.!
7 9
A less frequently encountered and less frequently discussed distinction and its tradeoffs
is the one implicated here: the vital difference between the method by which a federal
judge is selected to hear a case in litigation vis-A-vis the method by which arbitrators
are selected-a distinction hinted at by Justice White but frequently overlooked or
misinterpreted. All know that trial judges in the federal system are nominated and
confirmed only after a rigorous testing of their capabilities, experience, and integrity.
By contrast, arbitrators are quickly selected by the parties alone, who frequently have
unequal knowledge of or familiarity with the full history of potential arbitrators.
Federal trial judges are full-time dispute resolvers; the experience of arbitrators falls all
along the experience spectrum, from those who might serve but once or twice in a
lifetime to those who conduct arbitration with increasing regularity. The trial judge
who is to hear a case is almost never "selected" by or agreed on by the parties; rather,
such judge is "selected" or designated by objectively random or blind assignment
through long established court procedures (except in the rare case of a party's
successful forum shopping in a single-judge district, or consenting to try a case to a
known magistrate judge). In stark contrast, it is the parties to arbitration themselves
who have sole responsibility for the selection of their arbitrator or arbitrators.
Id. at 292.
175. Positive Software 11, 476 F.3d at 286 (majority opinion).
176. Id. at 288 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (stating that "the majority opinion ... [does] not
explain how Justice Black's majority opinion is irreconcilable with Justice White's
concurrence").
177. See id. at 282 (majority opinion) (stressing that Justice White's opinion should control
because it was based on "narrower grounds"). In his dissent, however, Judge Reavley noted that
"Justice White did not articulate an alternative rationale.... [He] merely stated what the Court
did not hold, which is not inconsistent with the majority opinion." Id. at 288 (Reavley, J.,
dissenting).
178. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
179. Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software 1),
436 F.3d 495, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New
Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software II), 476 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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While it is unclear how much actual contact the two had, the district court
found physical evidence that they, along with many others, were counsel of
record together.
180
This relationship demonstrates "evident partiality" because the relationship
is not trivial, as "it might have conveyed an impression of possible partiality to
a reasonable person.' 181 When both parties assumed the representation of the
former client, they obligated themselves to zealously work for that client.'
82
This obligation went far beyond the typical business relationships that
Commonwealth Coatings addressed and found to raise "evident partiality"
concerns. 83 Commenting on the seriousness of this obligation, Judge Wiener
stated that "[n]o relationship with a party or a lawyer is too minimal to warrant
its disclosure."' 84  Furthermore, because of their legal professional
responsibility obligations, both the arbitrator and counsel for New Century
were permanently linked to their former client, and thus permanently linked to
one another.'
85
The district court, which gathered the facts, was so convinced that "the
record had already established a failure to disclose," that it refused to let
Positive Software conduct any additional discovery relating to the possible
relationship between the arbitrator and New Century.186 Deference should be
given to a district court's findings of fact unless they are shown to be clearly
erroneous. 187  Given the record established in the district court, the Fifth
Circuit should have vacated the arbitrator's decision under FAA § 10 because





182. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2008) ("A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
183. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968).
184. Positive Software v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive Software 11), 476 F.3d 278,
291 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Wiener, J., concurring with dissent) (emphasis omitted).
185. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(A) (2008) (stating that once a
lawyer has represented a client in a matter, they cannot "represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter" without the original client's consent, regardless of how long ago the
lawyer represented the original client).
186. Positive Software 11, 476 F.3d at 290 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
187. Cf N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 100 (1982) (stating
that the appellate court shall accept findings of fact unless clearly erroneous).
188. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147 ("Section 10 does authorize vacation of
an award . . . '[w]here there was evident partiality ... in the arbitrators."').
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
D. The Rationale in Positive Software is Contrary To Congressional Intent
and is Unwarranted for Public Policy Reasons
Many of the courts that have endeavored to reduce the impact of the
"impression of possible bias" language from the Commonwealth Coatings
decision, including the en banc court in Positive Software II, have done so out
of fear that a robust application of an appearance of possible bias standard
would undermine the important values of the arbitral system. 189 On one level
these courts are correct-imposing a higher standard of disclosure on
arbitrators and putting a mechanism in place to enforce those standards may, at
least initially, create more litigation challenging arbitral awards. 190 When
arbitral decisions become subject to judicial challenge, they lose efficiency and
finality, two of the overarching goals of the arbitration system.
191
Even so, sacrificing some degree of finality and efficiency permits full
implementation of procedural fairness rules. 192 The Supreme Court said that in
creating the FAA, Congress showed a desire to create a fair and impartial
arbitration system. 193 Ensuring fairness and impartiality are core values in any
arbitration system. 194 Thus, Congress added § 10 of the FAA, which has been
interpreted to require arbitrators to disclose all previous relationships that give
the "impression of possible bias." 195 Ultimately, some sacrifice of efficiency
and finality must be tolerated in order to promote the level of procedural
fairness called for in § 10.196
Additionally, some courts, fearing that the "appearance of bias" standard
would result in disqualification of the most experienced arbitrators, have
incorrectly chosen the "actual bias" standard.197 However, as Justice Black
and Justice White make clear, forcing arbitrators to disclose possible sources
of bias does not remove those arbitrators from the available pool; it merely
189. See Positive Software 11, 476 F.3d at 285.
190. See, e.g., New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101, 1111
(9th Cir. 2007) (noting that "the public interest in efficient and final arbitration" need not be
sacrificed in order to achieve meaningful disclosure, but also recognizing that these interests may
conflict at times).
191. See Brunet, supra note 9, at 23-24 (discussing that the notion of finality in arbitration is
often tempered by the realities ofjudicial review).
192. See New Regency Prods., 501 F.3d at 1111 (concluding that a rule encouraging
disclosure is consistent with the interests of efficiency and finality).
193. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147.
194. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
195. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147, 149.
196. See New Regency Prods., 501 F.3d at 1111 (noting that efficiency and finality are
important goals of the arbitration system, and "a rule encouraging 'arbitrators [to] err on the side
of disclosure' is consistent with that interest" (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 152)
(alteration in original)).
197. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (Positive
Software 11), 476 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that the appearance of bias
standard would make it too easy for a losing party to challenge an arbitration).
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the "evident partiality" language of the
FAA to require the vacation of arbitral decisions when there is a reasonable
"impression of possible bias" on the part of the arbitrator. 199 This reasonable
"impression of possible bias" can stem from an arbitrator's failure to disclose
any relationship that may indicate bias.200 Given that legal standard, the court
in Positive Software II incorrectly overturned the vacatur of an arbitral award
where the arbitrator and counsel for one of the parties had previously worked
on the same case. Holding in this manner will damage the credibility of
arbitral decisions and may eventually deter people from participating in
arbitration rather than encourage them toward it.
198. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. This again demonstrates how
arbitrators are held to a different standard than judges.
199. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148-49.
200. See id. at 147-49.
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